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Public Lands and

People who knowingly take risks are supposed to conduct
themselves in a calm and matter-of-fact manner.

If you are

planning to go over Niagara Falls in a barrel, you are supposed
to adopt a steady and even blase demeanor, as if this risk-taking
were just a predictable part of a regular day's work.

While I

think I understand the theatrical demands here, there is still
something about declaring that you are planning, in the space of
half an hour, to give a summary history of a century of heated
debate over the public lands, that makes a pretense of coolness
and calmness a pretty hard set of stage directions to follow.
You'll pardon me, then, if I break the first rule of public
speaking and begin with a nervous apology, confessing that this
is a very daunting assignment and alerting you to the probable
fact that, should anyone choose to point out something important
that I failed to mention in this presentation, I am planning to
take the scoundrel's first line of defense, and explain that
limits of time prevented me from paying proper attention to that
important point, along with several hundred other points, as
well.

I guess there is something quite wonderfully unnerving

about speaking immediately before a panel carrying the subject
title, "Why We're Unhappy"--for fear that the panel's
unexpectedly united response might prove to be:
1

"Why are we

Unhappy?

Because of that disappointing and irritating speech we

just heard1”
Now the first thing, and the most obvious thing, that
historians have to say to participants in fights over public
lands issues today, is this:
the planet.

this fight began before you were on

For many people, the long duration of these

disagreements provides some comfort.

Somehow, there is less

injury available to take personally, when you realize that what
you are participating in is virtually a cross-generational relay
race of insult and accusation.

One generation carries the burden

of squabbling for its time, and then the torch is passed on, and
the next generation takes on the obligation to squabble.
Let me, then, offer a quick chronology of this wellpedigreed, infinitely sustainable boxing match, and sketch the
timing of its principal rounds.
Round One, roughly 1890 to 1910.

The triggering change was

the creation of the Forest Reserves and the exertion of
supervisory power over them by Theodore Roosevelt and Chief
Forester Gifford Pinchot.

In response, some Westerners did a

great deal of objecting to their loss of independence and free
access to resources.

The objecting aside, the concept of

permanent federal possession of some public lands became
established in both theory and practice.
Round Two, the 1920s.

In this episode, President Herbert

Hoover and his Secretary of the Interior Ray Lyman Wilbur tried
to seize the opportunity of ongoing discontent with federal
2

management by initiating a proposal to cede the federal lands to
the states.

"The federal government," President Hoover said, in

words that one is suprised not to hear quoted more often these
days, "is incapable of the adequate administration of matters
which require so large a measure of local understanding.

We must

seek every opportunity to retard the expansion of federal
bureaucracy and to place our communities in control of their own
destinies. . . . Western states have long since passed from their
swaddling clothes and are today more competent to manage much of
their affairs than is the federal government."

Hoover's Garfield

Commission concurred with this judgment at the end of the decade.
Oddly, Westerners were not particularly energized by this
opportunity, in large part because of the circumstances of the
onset of the Depression.

Thus, once upon a time, an official

federal commission offered to reverse the disclaimer clause, by
which entering Western states had disclaimed their rights to the
public lands, and nothing much happened as a result.
Round Three, the 1930s.

The principal event here was the

passage of the Taylor Grazing Act, transferring much of the
remaining public domain to federal management through a system of
grazing leases and creating a wonderfully confusing new property
right, the grazing right on public lands.

Here, again, the

conditions of the Depression blunted the region's usual reaction
against federal interference, and this change came with
substantial Western support.

The usual polarizations of the

public lands boxing match seemed reconfigured, and even
3

diminished, for this brief phase.
Round Four, the 1940s.

Resource-users renewed the

complaints against restrictions on use of public lands resources,
and demanded an increased power of governance for themselves and
a reduction in the funding and power of the Grazing Service, soon
to become the Bureau of Land Management.

Led by the spirited and

outspoken writings of Bernard DeVoto, conservationists resisted
what they called a resurgent land grab.
Round Five, the 1960s and 1970s.

Here the signal events

were the passage of the Wilderness Act in 1964, giving
preservationist concerns real standing in statute and courtroom,
and the mandating of multiple uses, including aesthetic and
recreational concerns, in the program for the Bureau of Land
Management through the Federal Land Policy and Management Act in
1976.

Similarly important was the conclusion, reached by the

Public Land Law Review Commission and recorded in the prelude to
FLPMA, declaring that the public lands would remain in permanent
retention under federal ownership and management.
Round Six, the late 1970s and the 1980s.

This is the phase

of the Sagebrush Rebellion, a movement in clear reaction against
the changes of Round Five, followed by the Reagan administration
effort to readjust the balance of public lands policy, away from
preservation and back toward use.

In the denunciation of federal

meddling and intrusion, and in the plea to return BLM lands to
the states, the Sagebrush Rebellion seemed to be a repeat of and
return to Round One; certainly the language often seemed to verge
4

on direct quotation from the Westerners who had fought Theodore
Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot eighty years before.

Battles that

were supposed to have been settled, battles that historians had
pretty much said were settled, were now reopened, and the premise
of permanent federal ownership, seemingly so clear in Round Five,
was now open for dispute.

And yet many of its opponents took the

approach of casting the Sagebrush Rebellion as an empty and
futile last gasp, one last revitalization movement undertaken by
people working in extractive industries that were clearly being
swept away by an urban-based enthusiasm for tourism, recreation,
and aesthetic appreciation of Western nature.
Round Seven, which is now.

Round Seven, which proves that

the Sagebrush Rebellion was not exactly what you'd call a last
gasp.

Round Seven, which, by virtue of the 1994 midterm

elections, with conservative, anti-government sentiment now well
represented in the House and Senate, might turn out to make the
Sagebrush Rebellion look like the 1970s rhetorical prelude to the
acts of substance of the 1990s, with the door seemingly wide open
to revived discussions of privatization and/or cession of the
public lands to the states.
Round Seven surprised a lot of people, and it certainly
surprised me.

It surprised me so much that I was forced to

realize how much I myself had fallen for that very popular
premise that many of these issues were supposed to be settled;
many controversies were supposed to have been filed away in
permanent storage; many disputes and disagreements were supposed
5

to have moved into that category in response to which the eyes of
regular people glaze over as they say, "This topic is now of only
historical interest."

All these issues, controversies, disputes,

and disagreements have broken out of the file cabinets and
archives and monographs and casebooks in which they were supposed
to have been permanently interred.
In moments of deep disorientation, historians go for timedepth, and this is clearly one of those moments.

So let us

reverse the logic of chronology, and briefly return to the era
before Round One, before the onset of the conservation movement.
In assessing the contentiousness of our own times, it is
important to acknowledge the many fights and struggles that
occurred before the 1880s and 1890s.

While they generally agreed

that the federal government should preside over a process of
transferring the public domain to private ownership, white
Americans disagreed with each other about the prices that people
should pay to acquire title to the public lands.

They disagreed

about the size of the plots of land that should be made available
to any individual owner.

They disagreed about the process by

which land should be surveyed, platted, claimed, and certified
for ownership.

Thus, while it is safe to say that white

Americans shared, for most of the nation's first century, an
agreement on the rightness of transferring land to private
ownership, it would certainly be a mistake to imagine that they
lived in a lost age of harmony and consensus.

White Americans

fought each other over the terms of disposal of the public
6

domain, and that, of course, was only one aspect of the fighting.
While issues of culture, religion, and politics played important
roles in the wars between whites and Indians, those wars were
also battles over real estate, battles over the control and
ownership of land.

So anyone who thinks that the last century's

debate has been distinctively contentious and disheartening, and
anyone who imagines a preceding age of greater agreement, should
be sent off to read the records of the white/Indian wars, as well
as the records of often fierce Congressional debates over land.
But there was one element of harmony in this early history,
and it may be the disappearance of this element that has led to
the greatest bewilderment and frustration in our times.

For much

of the nation's first century, white Americans had the comfort of
believing that individual self-advancement and profit followed
the same path as national advancement and profit.

In the cause

of westward expansion, the individual (or the individual with his
family) could pursue his own economic interests, seeking farmland
or minerals or business opportunity in the West, and feel that he
was at the same time engaged in national service.

Expanding

American settlements was patriotic duty; if the performance of
patriotic duty rewarded the individual with profit and property,
that was only further proof that the nation and the individual
shared the same values and pursued the same good.
But now we come back around to Round One of the debate, the
1890s and the first decade of the twentieth century, over
permanent federal ownership of public lands, in which that unity
7

of personal interest and national interest began to waver,

One

signal for the beginning of Round One was the emerging use, m
the 1870s and 1880s, of the term "timber famine," the growing
fear that the unrestrained exploitation that had eliminated the
forests of the upper Midwest might be about to move on to the
forests of the Trans-Mississippi West.

If those forests took the

same trouncing that the Midwestern forests had undergone, more
and more Americans began to worry, wouldn't the nation be put at
risk— at risk of having to figure out how to maintain a thriving
economy without the crucial material for building and
construction?

Individual profit-seeking would then no longer be

national service; on the contrary, individual profit-seeking
would erode the base of the nation's security and prosperity.
If you have been reading these proclamations of concern over
a prospective timber famine, then Congress's action, in 1891,
creating the process that would allow the president to designate
forest reserves, makes a great deal of sense.

Contemplating the

early origins of federal conservation can be a wonderfully
disorienting experience— one has to think, for instance, of
Grover Cleveland, not simply as the fellow who ran for office
while stories of his having fathered an illegitimate child
pursued him.

(You remember the verse, a verse well worth keeping

in mind when we decry the decline in the level of political
discourse in our own times:
White House, ha ha ha.")

"Ma, Ma, where's my Pa?/Gone to the
In this story, Grover Cleveland

emerges as a man of courage and vision in his willingness to
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designate Forest Reserves and to press Congress to come up with a
system for their management.

This reappraisal is certainly good

news for Cleveland, even if it works to remove a little of the
lustre and originality from Theodore Roosevelt and his trusted
forester friend, Gifford Pinchot.
So in Round One, in response to the prospect of a dangerous
timber famine, Congress invented the idea of forest reserves;
Presidents began to respond to the opportunity presented by this
invention; and some Westerners began to express outrage over this
fundamental change in the rules.
things to note in this:

There is a very important

namely, the outraged Westerners were

right— they were not subject to paranoid delusions— this was a
fundamental change in the rules, a change from disposal to
retention, and a change dividing individual benefit from national
benefit.
This idea is going to come up several times this morning,
and probably more times in the course of this conference.

Until

I had to work on this presentation, I had never noticed how much
all of the present participants in public lands debates—
proponents of federal management, resource-users who oppose
federal management, environmentalists who sometimes support and
sometimes criticize federal management, historians, students in
American history survey courses— I had never realized how every
single one of u s . for all our disagreements, agree on one,
completely misguided assumption:

that somewhere in this story of

the public lands, the rules got firmed up, settled on, agreed on,
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resolved, defined, figured out.

We date this moment of

resolution differently, but we all bank on the notion that on
some occasion— whether it was the creation of Forest Reserves
that were still supposed to accommodate the needs of legitimate
timber-users; or the creation of advisory boards for the Grazing
Service, boards that gave a great role for the resource-users to
play; or the passage of the Wilderness Act in 1964; or the
passage of FLPMA in 1976; wherever we date this moment, we think
that was the moment when the real rules took shape, and whatever
failures of rule-observance that happened after that moment are
just wrong and literally against the rules.

When the rules we

like got established, that was the moment of resolution, of
definition, of consolidated, settled progress; when those rules
got violated, changed, or replaced, that was when unfairness set
in.
So a number of Western resource users in the 1890s and the
first decade of the twentieth century thought that the rules had
been changed on them, and they were right.

But the pattern of

though persisted through the century, that sense of injury over
the changeability of the rules, the urge to believe in that
elusive moment of final victory or final defeat.

My personal

feeling is that we have all been ruined by hearing and telling
stories, by reading novels, by watching movies and TV shows.
Exposure to these narrative forms has ruined us, because they all
come with endings, and they create in us the expectation that the
stories of our lives and our society will also come with endings.
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The implementation of the Taylor Grazing Act will conclude the
story of the public lands by making it clear that henceforth
resource-users must play a definitive role in the governance of
the public lands; the passage of the Wilderness Act will conclude
the story by making it clear that henceforth the aesthetic value
assigned to untouched nature will have to be reckoned into land
use questions; the report of the Public Land Law Review
Commission and the passage of FLPMA will conclude the story by
making it clear that the public lands will henceforth be retained
in permanent federal ownership.

Time will, of course, move on,

but, in the future, we will play within the rules— the
"henceforths"— established at these defining moments.
Well, surprise.

For just about everybody, that "henceforth"

has proven to be a trick.

There is no conclusion to this story;

t;

there is no moment when the "permanent" rules got established and
defined.

Public land policy remains a process of maddening

historical changeability and contingency, and I think that is one
principal reason why everyone got so cranky in our times— because
resource-users or environmentalists, everyone thought that the
history of the public lands had reached some kind of defining
moment, some kind of future-policy-determining conclusion, some
occasion when the real rules got written, affirmed, ratified, and
implemented.
So things were unsettled a hundred years ago, and things are
unsettled now, and it is quite common to hear people say that
this unsettlement is only another repetition of a repeated cycle.
11

I want to take a moment to record samples of the denunciations of
the Forest Reserves denunciations made at the turn of the
century.

As you listen, you might ask yourself, Does history

repeat itself?

Am I listening to a broken record, then and now?

Or are the people who are saying the things that sound like this
today, in fact, intentionally and knowingly echoing their
predecessors, but imitating that older language in what are
actually very changed circumstances?
Here are appraisals of the Forest Reserves, in the judgment
of some Westerners a hundred years ago:

the Reserves were "a

program designed to harass and annoy"; they were "crackpot
schemes of politicians in Washington"; "as nefarious a scheme as
ever disgraced the nation"; "the dude design for an outdoor
museum and menagerie"; "the destruction of the people who have
gone and built up homes"; "a reckless exercise of power"; "rank
imbecility"; "obnoxious measures of Eastern visionaries";
"intolerable usurpations of power"; "a system paralyzing all
progress"; "an un-American carpetbag system of government."
And here are characterizations, from the enemies of
conservation at the turn of the century, of the people behind the
Forest Reserves:

"the aesthetic Eastern people who are not

interested in the country and who will plaster the West with
reservations that will retard and cripple the hardy pioneers";
"sentimentalists and dudes"; "theorists, enthusiasts, cranks";
"ill-informed bureaucrats in Washington offices"; "a few
theorists who learned their forestry by reading about European
12

forests"; "distant dictators with only a theoretical knowledge of
the West"; "people who do not know a ranch from a pink tea
party"; "goggle-eyed, bandy-legged dudes from the East and sad
eyed, absent-minded professors and bugologists."
So we hear characterizations in a similar spirit today.

Is

this a repetition of history, a recurring cycle that bears some
resemblance to the way night follows day and day follows night?
Summer follows spring, spring follows winter, winter follows
autumn, autumn follows summer, and phases of Western crankiness
and ill-temper follow phases of Western affability and
collaborativeness?
I do not, myself, really believe history really runs through
cycles— not in wars, presidents, cultural enthusiasms, economic
events, or public lands debates.

I do think, however, that

people often make conscious appeals to history.

I think they

consciously and knowingly adopt the fashions, language, and
behavior of historical figures.

People sometimes imitate and

echo the people of the past in a way that can make it seem that
historical cycles are rolling over and over, rather in the manner
of a Ferris wheel.

Americans who are defying centralized

authority have a perfectly understandably habit of citing the
inspiration of the American Revolution, or sometimes even the
defiance of the Confederacy.

This does not mean that either

George Washington or Robert E. Lee is about to ride again; it
only means that their example is being borrowed, adopted, and
appropriated to serve some purpose and in some cause, in what are
13

actually very different conditions.
The word "cycles11 does appear in the description of this
talk, and that, in itself, demonstrates how recently I have
myself come to reject this idea.

What finally caught up with me

may well have been the problems involved in being a big Roy
Orbison fan.

I have always admired Roy Orbison a great deal, but

necessity still requires one to admit that some of his songs are
deeply silly.

In the album released just at the time of his

death, there is an extremely goofy song, in which Roy is playing
his usual role of the abandoned lover.
is both distinctive and ridiculous:

But this time the setting

he has gotten on a Ferris

wheel, and his girlfriend and her new boyfriend have stopped the
Ferris wheel while Roy's little chair is at the top, and then the
girlfriend and the new boyfriend have left the amusement park,
and left Roy to sit in his lonely perch, until someone in the
morning can come to his rescue and start the wheel rotating
again.
This absurd song, posing as it does a terrible test of
loyalty and affection for all of Roy's fans, may be what brought
me to my senses, causing me to realize that this "cycles of
i

history" phrase is a terribly deadening metaphor and figure of
speech.

A cycle of history finally has all the flexibility and

contingency and variation of a Ferris wheel ride; you go up, you
come down, you go up again, and (barring the misfortune that
befell Roy) you come down again.

Your best hope for excitement

is a great view from the top, or a treacherous girlfriend with
14

close, personal ties to the fellow running the wheel.
The cycles of a Ferris wheel, just like the cycles of
history, lack narrative drama.

They also give the rider

absolutely nothing to exercise in the way of human will and
choice.

You can ride your cycle of history with terror or you

can ride it with pleasure, but the cycles follow exactly the same
path either way.
I do not think the phases of debate over the federal
government's retention of the public lands constitute a repeated
set of cycles, because of two things.

First, I believe that a

comparatively widespread discomfort with the idea and practice of
permanent federal ownership of public lands never disappeared.
The reason for that is twofold, and obvious:

because federal

ownership Of public lands has constricted some people's free
choice and economic opportunity, and because federal ownership of
public lands is at odds with a widespread definition of the
appropriate and limited role of the federal government; in
contrast to a theoretically much purer, if also potentially much
more destructive, kind of democratic access, federal management
of public lands is autocratic and even elitist.

Thus, the

discontent never went away, but it did get louder and quieter; it
got more and less visible; or, maybe most to the point, it got
more publicized and less publicized— but I don't think it ever
went away.

Cycles of publicity are, after all, quite different

from cycles of history, though if one is keeping one's eye on the
most available records, it is easy enough to confuse the two.
15

My second reason for rejecting the "cycles" notion is that
the circumstances surrounding each phase of the public lands
debate are simply too different, even though the attacks on
federal management, then and now, certainly sound the same in
temper and spirit.

At the turn of the century, the federal

government really changed the rules.

No wonder some Westerners

were angry; Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford PinChot really were
setting up a new game, very different from the days of open
access.
1990s.

But that game and its rules are hardly "new" in the
And, just as important, the usual "Easterners against

Westerners" polarity is nowhere near as clear as it might have
seemed a century ago.

By this point in time, many federal land

management officials are not Eastern outsiders or invaders, but
Westerners themselves, while many, probably most, of the men who
had been shaping federal land policy in Congress have been from
the West themselves.

To pit the West against the East may have

been fine and often effective rhetoric, but it was poor history,
and poor sociology, of the public lands debate.
One of the principal problems of the West/East formulation
has been this:

the West never had one voice or one point of

view, at any point in history.

If you want a down-to-earth,

concrete reminder of this, look at the Official Proceedings of
the Colorado Conservation Commission from 1909 and 1910.

First,

one has to be struck by the fact that Western states had their
own conservation commissions; conservation was not simply a
federal mandate descending from outside.
16

Before they had

conservation commissions, Western territories and states had
established Fish and Game commissions; in other words, the active
role of the states in conservation is a much under-studied story,
but we know enough to say that support for governmentally-managed
conservation had roots in many places besides Washington, D.C.
Second, one has to be struck by the diversity of opinion
that appears in the records of the Colorado Conservation
Commission.

Here is the testimony of Ellsworth Bethel, Professor

of Botany in East Side High School in Denver in 1909:

"The

spirit of carelessness and vandalism which manifests itself in
the destruction of forests, birds, wild flowers and scenery must
be repressed either through laws or by propagating a sentiment of
protection and kindness towards every living thing."

Well, so

much for that urbanite and botanist, Professor Bethel, one could
say; hardly a typical voice of the West with that profile.

But

then here is Mr. J. B. Killian, President of the Delta County
Stock Growers' Association, speaking to the Commission in 1909.
If you have yielded to the notion of a united Western voice and
point of view, you may think you know what the president of the
Delta County Stock Growers' Association was going to say about
Forest Reserves, but prepare for surprise:

"With the excessive

misuse and waste of the God-given resources of our public domain
there has followed [an] awful depletion of timber, forage and
moisture," Mr Killian told the Commission.

Working with their

neighboring Forest Reserve, he and his stockraising neighbors now
enjoyed "peace, protection and prosperity, instead of suffering
17

the pangs of friction, bloodshed., and criminality."
Reserve had brought stability.
tomorrow."

The Forest

"We know today what we may expect

"It seems folly," Mr. Killian said, "for men to

assert that this whole commonwealth is up in arms against what
they term 'Pinchot's Bureaucracy.'

We endorse the administration

as we find it."
The voice of the West then and the voice of the West now
were and are full of variation.

We lose a great deal of clarity

and accuracy when we say things like, "The West opposed Gifford
Pinchot and the Forest Reserves," or "The West today is in revolt
against federal land management."

Some Westerners asked for

Forest Reserves to be created in their locales; some Westerners,
once Reserves became their neighbors, thought that this had been
a pretty good development.

No partisan today can claim to have

inherited the mantle from those earlier times; no one can claim
to be the true and authentic spokesperson for the Westerners of
the past, because Western opinion has never fallen into clear and
easy patterns.
But now we reach the aspect of the present circumstances
that shows the greatest difference from the situation at the turn
of the century:

now, it seems to me, it is really not sufficient

to look at the public lands debate in a regional context.

There

is a great necessity to look beyond the West to understand the
public lands debate today.

I refer to the post-Watergate and

post—Iran/Contra cynicism about government; I refer to the
widespread disillusionment with federal handling of matters like
18

health care and urban decline and racial equity and deficit
management; I refer to the widely dispersed, sometimes quite
scary anti-government feeling abroad in the land; and I refer, as
well, to the post-Cold War loss of national orientation, the loss
of a reliable sense of who our enemies are and what, in turn, our
common enterprise against those enemies might require of us.
Think, if you will, of what an ill-advised move it would be for
one of the presidential candidates in 1996 to borrow the rhetoric
of 1960 and to campaign with the refrain, "Ask not what your
country can do for you, but what you can do for your country."
Ask what you can do for your country, indeed; ask, instead, how
to keep your country off your back and out of your way.

In this

sense, then, the public lands debate is now situated in a much
broader and much more troubling set of questions about national
coherence and shared purpose.
An even more puzzling and troubling part of our times has to
do with the widespread pattern of people casting themselves as
victims.

After a phase of white people listening to people of

color talk about victimization, white people seem, in the 1990s,
to have adopted the position, "We'd like to use some of that
rhetoric for ourselves, too."

And so many white Americans— and

here the Wise Use sorts are part of a much bigger trend— have now
cast themselves as the real victims, the ones whose victimization
is made all the more unjust because this was supposed to be their
country, with a government that was supposed to work in their
interests.

Indeed, when it comes to absorbing the blame and
19

responsibility that no one wants to claim for themselves, the
handiest target around is the federal government.
.y

So these are quite different times, in political culture,
quite a world apart from the world of the early twentieth
century.

And yet no one can discount the continued resonance of

the words of H. H. Eddy, of Denver, speaking to the Colorado
Commission on Conservation in 1909, on the subject of the "Ethics
of the National Forests."

How can we get the best administration

of the Forest Reserve system? Mr. Eddy asked his audience.
How can this best be done?
[Can we get it] by treating
the administration of the forests from a personal
standpoint; by ridicule; by vituperation; by
exaggerated . . . criticism; by overlooking the good
that is being done and exhausting our energies in
seeking and publishing to the world every instance of
friction or hardship that may have resulted from
misconstrued or misapplied law or overzealous service,
thus embittering . . . the general public against not
[only] those who administer the forests, but as well
against the idea [of the reserves] itself? Or would it
be better to pursue the other alternative, and work
with the administration rather than against it,
encourage it for the great good that it is undoubtedly
doing, and criticise only with a desire and in the
spirit of progress and improvement?
We can say that Mr. Eddy lived, and asked his question, in much
more innocent times, without a full understanding of the rat's
nest of issues the Forest Reserves would inspire, and certainly
without an understanding of the sense of helplessness, impotence,
frustration that individuals can feel when they face off
against a large federal bureaucracy.

For all that, Mr. Eddy's

question still seems to me one of those moments when a long-dead
person suddenly seems alive, and suddenly addresses his
posterity

addresses us, in the present, with a question we still
20

have to answer even if its asker has left the planet.
say to Mr. Eddy, eighty-six years later?

What do we

If we want the best

resolution to the questions of the public lands, do we reach that
resolution by ridicule and vituperation, by reciprocal name
calling and condemnation?

Can we criticize, as he said, in the

spirit of the greater good, or do we have to report to Mr. Eddy
that we no longer have a clue, individually or collectively, what
that concept of the "greater good" means in practice?

Mr. Eddy

awaits our answer, as do several million others whose interests,
emotions, and history are invested in the public lands.

Has our

long history of squabbling on this topic just made us all the
more enthusiastic and skilled as fighters.

Or, in ways that this

conference might demonstrate, can an awareness of our inheritance
of conflict and contention make us at least a little more
sensible and careful about how we fight?
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